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SUMMARY: The path towards a common market requires an alignment of 
macroeconomic policies. In the case of the MERCOSUL member countries, the observed 
disparities in the exchange, tax and monetary policies constitute major imbalances and 
impede future international economic integration. Apart from residual differences on trade 
policies among the member countries, macroeconomic policy disparities also reflect 
populism and the resulting lack of political will and mutual commitment with the regional 
goals.  There is general professional agreement that, under a fixed exchange rate regimen 
with trade protection, the social exchange rate exceeds the official and/or market rate. 
Accordingly, the adoption of an exchange regimen with flexible exchange rates certeris 
paribus should significantly reduce the difference between the official exchange or market 
rate and the social exchange rate.     
 
    The general purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the changes of 
exchange policies in Brazil against the backdrop of the MERCOSUR economic integration 
process. To do this, an appropriate measure for the social exchange rate is developed and 
estimated.  This measure also has an immediate practical relevance, as it is suitable for use 
in the economic analysis of investment projects in Brazil.  
 
    By using a model of opportunity cost for foreign exchange to estimate the social 
exchange rate, the study concludes that there was no relevant alteration in the order of 
economic activities according to the degree of effective protection. The exchange policy 
changes effects will only be felt in the medium and long run, but their reflections can 
already be clearly perceived through the declining tendency of the social exchange rate.   
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
   The formation of regional trade blocks has intensified during recent years, 
reflecting in part a component of and a reaction to the globalization process.  In this aspect, 
MERCOSUR development is closely linked to an alignment of its members’ 
macroeconomic policies, since the political and economic evidence clearly shows that the 
differences in the exchange, tax and monetary policies are increasingly deepening the 
imbalances among its members. The ongoing economic and political crisis in Argentina 
may very well in the end speed up a convergence process, mainly towards an alignment of 
the exchange policy for MERCOSUR. 
 
    During the 1950s and until late 1980s, the prevailing economic development 
strategy as revealed through the pursuit of economic policies was one of import substitution 
led industrialization. Currency overvaluation, coupled with recurrent foreign exchange 
crises, was accompanied by heavy protection for domestic industrial activities. Import 
policies allowed only the entrance of products with no national similar or to complement 
the domestic production. These import policies were characterized by very high customs 
duties, discretionary controls by the government and special tax regimens.
1  It was only in 
the very late 1980s, and especially the early 1990s, that this heavy protection began to be 
dismantled by a sweeping trade policy reform. 
 
    As a key part of a series of economic policy reforms during the 1990s, the 
Government successfully launched a stabilization program (the Plano Real) in 1994; this 
program embodied de-indexation, more conventional monetary policies, confidence 
boosting through a verbal commitment to renewed fiscal discipline, and the use of the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor, which was gradually transformed into a crawling peg.  
Although inflation dropped dramatically, it did not fall quickly enough to avoid substantial 
currency appreciation in real terms.  The resultant overvaluation in turn undermined export 
performance, produced pressures to partially reverse some of the gains in trade policy 
liberalization, undercut economic growth, and dictated restrictive interest rate policies to 
defend the exchange rate.  Finally, in January 1999 the Government was forced to abandon 
the crawling rate system and to adopt a flexible exchange rate regime.   
 
With a flexible exchange rate regime, the freedom of capital movement reduces 
the space for irresponsible fiscal policies, such as, for instance, increasing governmental 
expenses with no provisions made for their financing.  Large public sector deficits during 
1995-97 were accompanied by large increases in public sector debts. Greater fiscal 
discipline, reflected by public sector primary surpluses during 1999-2002, has staved off 
financial crisis, but the overall macroeconomic balances remain precarious. Pressures to 
refinance the public sector debt keep real interest rates in Brazil high, deterring 
investment and undermining future economic growth.   
 
 
                                                 
1 Typical examples of the discretionary controls in use were the imposition of import (and export) quotas and 
the prohibition of importation of certain products. Under special taxation regimens a considerable portion of the 
import schedule was favored with tax reductions or even exemptions.   4
    The overall objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the changes of 
exchange policies in Brazil against the backdrop of the MERCOSUR economic integration 
process. To do this, an appropriate measure for the social exchange rate is developed and 
estimated.  Specifically, this measure has an immediate practical relevance, as it is suitable 
for use in the economic analysis of investment projects in Brazil.  
 
 
2.   MERCOSUL: CONSIDERATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
    The Asuncion Treaty signed in March 1991, set forth the stages required for the 
formation of a common market among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, known as 
MERCOSUR. Although it has been going through a critical phase because of the Argentina 
exchange crisis, the region represents about 75% of the South America’s GDP, 60% of its 
population and 65% of its territory. From the geographical viewpoint, MERCOSUL is the 
largest customs union in the world. The geographical area covered by MERCOSUL is 
almost four times larger than that of the European Union. Figure 1 presents the evolution of 
the total Brazilian trade with MERCOSUL during the period 1980-2000. After 
MERCOSUR’s creation in 1992, there has been a significant increase in the intra-regional 
trade.  Beginning in 1998, the total Brazil-MERCOSUL trade fell as a result of the 
economic and exchange problems experienced by Argentina.  
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   As world trade expands, the importance of the exchange rate in transactions 
between countries increases proportionally. Thus, exchange stability between the 
currencies of the same economic bloc becomes increasingly important. The occurrence of a 
systematic devaluation of a certain currency in relation to another currency of another 
member country will bring forth an ongoing accumulation of deficits in the balance of trade 
of the partner with the more stable currency. On the other hand, an artificial exchange 
valuation may cause still worse results. The result may be the surging of demands for 
compensating mechanisms in the impaired country, consequently affecting the free trade in 
the integration area.  Thus, an environment marked by an exchange instability process 
entailing frequent alterations in relative prices generates uncertainties on the investment 
decisions and distortions in the production of goods and services.  
 
    International experience and the economic literature
2 provide some examples of 
the importance of intra-region exchange stability.  The relatively low instability of actual 
exchange rates historically observed within the European Union is considered a positive 
factor in the consolidation of the single European market. On the other hand, the scenario 
of exchange instability of Latin American countries in the 60’s and 70’s is noted as one of 
the main reasons for the failed attempts to regional integration.   
 
     Argentina presents a good example of the ill effects of inconsistent 
macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, with resultant exchange instability and 
economic crisis.  In the early 1990s, precisely to assure some modicum of exchange and 
economic stability, the Argentine government adopted a currency board, fixed exchange 
rate regime.  With the illusion that the regime would permanently guarantee peso 
convertibility at the stipulated one peso to one US dollar exchange rate, much of the 
economy became dollarized. However, as the 1990s wore on, expansionary Argentine 
fiscal policies, with the accumulation of substantial debt, undermined the viability of the 
currency board regime, and dollar convertibility at the stipulated exchange rate had to be 
abandoned. The economic and political consequences, with attendant banking system 
insolvency, economic collapse, rapid impoverishment increases, and high unemployment, 
are still unfolding.  
 
    Argentina has been a major participant in MERCOSUL, especially in relation to 
its trade with Brazil. The current economic crisis in Argentina presents important questions 
regarding the future of MERCOSUL.  Nonetheless, in addition to discussions among the 
MERCOSUL member countries, important ongoing negotiations are taking place. Perhaps 
most importantly, discussions are currently underway – both at the MERCOSUL level and 
individual country level – concerning proposals for the formation of Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA).  In addition, negotiations are also taking place between the MEROSUL 
countries and the European Union regarding the establishment of a free trade agreement. 
Recent economic analysis, based upon a comprehensive general equilibrium-modeling 
framework, show Brazil reaping considerable economic gains from either or both of these 
potential free trade arrangements.
3  There is also a proposal to expand MERCOSUL with 
the joining of member countries of the Andean Community (CAN).  Finally, the coming 
                                                 
2 Arguments along this line, with supporting evidence, are presented in GENBERG & SIMONE (1993). 
3 See TARR et al (2002).   6
round of multilateral trade negotiations, agreed in Doha in November 2001, also hold the 
prospect for additional Brazilian, and MERCOSUL, benefits from greater market access. 
An overall question is whether the multi-lateralism and the extension of regionalism could 
threaten MERCOSUR.   
 
    Three possible scenarios, or options, can be contemplated in this regard:
4 
 
1.  There are those who think that MERCOSUL will be short-lived. They point to the 
negotiations underway and the separation between the countries with each country 
going its own way in accordance with its own interests.  Avoiding larger political 
attrition with the various meetings, it is argued, will lead to no practical and useful 
result for the parties; 
2.  The second option is very close to the first. It points out to the collapse of intra-
regional investments within the MERCOSUL, bearing in mind that the limited 
investment obtained so far has been precariously maintained, so there is little 
incentive for any new investments; and 
3.  Finally, a third option has a lot to do with a similar experience occurred in the 
European Union. Currently, Argentina – beset by unfolding economic crisis – has 
been responsible for continuous conflict within the MERCOSUL and resultant 
paralysis of MERCOSUL actions. During the 1960s, France pursued a similar 
disruptive stance within the European Union. Thus, the action taken by the 
European Community at the time was important. After many recurring problems 
and a serious institutional crisis, the so-called Hague Summit was held in December 
1969. It set forth a group of goals to be reached, which served as basis for the 
European Community’s actions and which was known as a community tripod of 
goals and agreed actions.
5 As the name suggests, the tripod may be summed up in 
three words: deepening (more integration between the member states with the 
creation of an economic and monetary union), completion (full achievement of 
common policies and launching of new policies) and widening (increase of number 
of members with the joining of new members).  
 
    The third option, in fact, can be interpreted as a deepening of MERCOSUL, with 
widening of its means of action, as well as the aspects included in the Common External 
Tariff (TEC) and technical standards, aiming at a more advanced integration stage. This 
would include completing existing agreed actions and launching new policies aimed at 
more complete economic integration for MERCOSUL. Another important and desirable 




    The important element in the discussions currently underway is the search for a 
continuous deepening of MERCOSUR’s regional integration. Clearly this goal can be 
attained with no need to choose between regionalism and multi-lateralism. These are not 
                                                 
4 See the article of BASSO & FLOH (2001) in Gazeta Mercantil of 19/06/2001. 
5 See BASSO & FLOH (2001), op cit.. 
6Venezuela has formally presented its application for admission under the same conditions as Chile and Bolivia.    7
necessarily considered conflicting tendencies or goals, but rather converging ones, as long 
as the implicit arrangements are well balanced and well negotiated. 
 
     Table 1 shows the evolution of the nominal and effective tariff protection rates in 
Brazil for the period 1987-2000. As observed, the Brazilian trade opening process caused a 
decrease of the average nominal rate from 49 to 17.1% for capital goods and from 57.5 to 
14.1% for other imported goods. Correspondingly, there were also observed decreases in 
the average effective tariff rates, e.g., from 47.5 to 17.8% for capital goods and from 77.1 
to 18.8% for other imported goods, during the period. 
 
























Source: KUME, PIANI & SOUZA (2000) for 1987/1998 and TYLER (2002) for 1999 and 2000. 
 
    Authors such as VALLS PEREIRA (1998), recognizing the importance of the 
exchange stability for MERCOSUR, recommend consistent domestic policies and similar 
inflation rates for the member states. Besides the establishment of common inflation goals, 
they suggest an agreement on the exchange system for MERCOSUL countries.  
 
    To conclude, convergence in a regional integration agreement towards a common 
market requires an alignment of macroeconomic policies. Evidence clearly demonstrates 
that marked differences between the exchange, tax and monetary policies deepen the 
imbalances between the members. Such an alignment constitutes a difficult challenge 
because of a lack of political will and mutual commitment to regional goals. However, the 
recent events in Argentina may well, in the end, expedite this convergence process, mainly 
towards an alignment of exchange policies for MERCOSUL. 
 
 















1987 15.6  49.0  57.5  8.3  47.5  77.1 
1988 5.6  46.8  39.6    -2.9  50.2  52.1 
1989 1.9  38.8  32.1    -5.4  44.0  46.5 
1990 3.3  37.2  30.5    -3.4  41.5  47.7 
1991 1.7  28.5  23.6    -4.0  31.3  34.8 
1992 0.6  20.2  15.7    -4.0  22.1  20.3 
1993 0.0  19.1  13.5    -5.0  21.7  16.7 
1994 0.0  19.0  11.2    -4.9  22.4  13.6 
1995 0.0  16.5  12.8    -2.4  18.0  17.1 
1996 0.0  15.5  13.0    -1.8  16.7  19.9 
1997 0.0  17.8  15.6    -2.2  18.6  21.6 
1998 0.0  17.7  15.5    -2.2  18.6  20.2 
1999 0.0  17.6  14.8    -1.8  18.2  19.6 
2000 0.0  17.1  14.1    -1.6  17.8  18.8   8
3.   METHODOLOGY 
 
   With such major ongoing phenomena as globalization and the expansion of 
international trade relations, the divergence between the official or market exchange rate 
and the social rate cannot be disregarded in project evaluation.  If the required adjustments 
are not made, there will be an over- or underestimate of the project costs and benefits. 
Consequently, market prices will not necessarily reflect social, or scarcity, prices. Thus, we 
have to proceed with the necessary adjustments to the exchange rate for the purpose of 
project evaluation. With this wider goal in mind and in the light of the existing literature, a 
specific model was adapted to the Brazilian conditions for the calculation of the social 
exchange rate. Whenever a project is likely to affect a country’s balance of payments, its 
foreign currency-calculated items must be properly adjusted with the utilization of the 
social exchange rate. 
 
    A project can affect a country’s balance of payments in three ways: (a) increases 
in exports, as a result of the goods or services produced;  (b) increments in imports of the 
equipment and inputs required; and (c) decreases in imports of similar or substitute goods. 
 
    The concept of social exchange rate in Brazil, widely used in the economic or 
social evaluation of projects, is formalized in the pioneering work developed by Bacha and 
Taylor.
7 In order to assess the impact of changes of a country’s exchange policy, its results 
have to be analyzed in relation to the social benefits and costs generated by the project 
implementation.  
 
   The relevant literature presents various methodological alternatives for the 
calculation of the social exchange rate.
8 The possibilities of using use more involved 
alternative methodological approaches such as the estimation of a fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rate and of the social cost of foreign exchange generation were assessed but not 
pursued for data availability reasons.  
 
    It is widely accepted by economists that the social exchange rate is usually higher 
than the official rate or the market rate. Accordingly, it is correct to say that the social 
(direct) benefits with an export or with a decrease in imports are higher than the respective 
amounts in currency units.  Likewise, the social (direct) costs with an import or with a 
decrease in exports surpass the conversion into currency units at the current exchange rate.  
 
    The argument of the balanced exchange rate has several versions. The simplest 
one adopts as social exchange rate the exchange relationship or parity exchange between 
two currencies providing identical market value in a typical basket of goods and services. 
 
    The methodology for the calculation of the opportunity cost of foreign exchange 
consists of decomposing the offer function of foreign exchange revenues in order to 
                                                 
7 See works by BACHA (1970) and BACHA & TAYLOR (1971). 
8The main methodological alternatives used for the calculation of the social exchange rate are: linear and non-
linear programming, the opportunity costs of foreign exchange, the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate 
(FEER), and the social costs of generating foreign exchange.   9
compare the opportunity costs of various ways to expand foreign exchange revenues. This 
approach is related to the Ricardian principle of comparative advantage in world trade. 
Generally, the opportunity cost models for generating net foreign exchange are the simplest 
and based on the static theory of international trade. Following this reasoning, the existence 
or not of distortions in the operation of domestic markets of factors, tariff policy, the 
existence of quotas, prohibitions, preferential agreements between nations, dumping and 
other barriers to foreign trade are considered to be relevant and measurable. Thus, the 
social benefits and costs generated by a certain project are calculated from an actual 
situation and evidently not from an ideal situation. Consequently, the calculation of the 
social exchange rate using this methodological approach requires a more generic model.
9 
 
    Brazil’s participation in total world trade corresponded to less than 1%
10 in 2000. 
Therefore, the hypothesis of a small country, usual in international economics, can be 
applied to the Brazilian case, since its economy has a marginal participation in the total of 
world imports and exports. As a result, international prices are not affected by greater 
imports or exports carried out by the country.
11 
 
    The empirical analysis used secondary data of the balance of payments (presented 
in Table 2) and elasticity estimates for export and import prices, which are shown in Table 
3.  Both exports and imports of any good or service are obtained respectively from the 
excess offer and domestic demand. The hypothesis of international prices being given for 
the country is imposed below in the development of the analytical framework.   
 
 
                                                 
9The theoretical development and popularization of this approach are due to Arnold C. Harberger of Chicago 
University. The treatment is, in general lines, similar to that adopted for the social cost of other inputs 
discussed by CONTADOR (2000). Although HARBERGER (1972) adopts the tariffs and subsidies on import 
and export as the only distortions, there are no great difficulties in expanding the reasoning to consider also 
the distortions in the markets of factors. 
10 According to data from Foreign Trade Secretariat  (SECEX), of the Ministry of Development, Industry and 
Foreign Trade, the participation of Brazilian exports and imports in 2000, in relation to the world total, was 
0.88 and 0.89%, respectively. It can be noted that these shares have fallen from around 3% in the late 1940s. 
11 This hypothesis (the small country assumption in international trade theory) can be incorrect in certain 
cases, such as, for instance, coffee exports, where Brazilian behavior can affect international price. Soybeans 
is another basic product for which Brazil, having emerged as a major world exporter, also has the ability to 
affect world prices in these markets.    10
 
Table 2: Behavior of Brazil’s Trade Balance, 1980-2000 (US$ Million) 
 
 
  Exports (X)  Imports (M)  Balance 
Year  Basic  Manufactured  Total  Oil  Capital Goods  Total  (X – M) 
1980  8428  9028 20133 9405  4381 22954  -2821 
1981  8852  11884 23292 10600  4023  22092  1200 
1982  8195 10253  20176 9568  3272 19395  781 
1983  8484 11275  21899 8607  2506 15429  6470 
1984  8755 15132  27006 6735  2151 13916  13090 
1985  8538 14063  25642 5418  2480 13154  12488 
1986  7280 12404  22349 2786  3464 14045  8304 
1987  8022 14839  26224 3850  3958 15053  11171 
1988  9411 19187  33789 3198  4795 14605  19184 
1989  9548 18634  34383 3390  4576 18263  16120 
1990  8748 16988  31414 4354  3989 20661  10753 
1991  8737 17757  31620 3371  4256 21041  10579 
1992  8840 21396  35862 3069  4499 20554  15308 
1993  9366 23473  38597 2138  5091 25659  12938 
1994  11058 24959 43545  2339  7575  33105  10440 
1995  10969 25565 46506  2587  11445 49664  -3158 
1996  11900 26413 47747  3461  12705 53301  -5554 
1997  14474 29190 52990  3220  16993 61347  -8357 
1998  12970 29369 51120  1964  16089 57594  -6474 
1999  11827 27328 48011  2124  13555 49272  -1261 
2000  12562 32528 55086  3188  13586 55783  -697 
Source: FGV, Conjuntura Econômica.           11
 





offer price (ε) 
Elasticity-import 
demand price (η) 
CARVALHO & DE NEGRI (2000)     
Basic Products  0.123  -1.342 
World Imports (PB)  0.655  - 
RESENDE (1997)    
Total Imports (short term)  -  -0.540 
Total Imports (long term)  -  -0.083 
VARGAS (1993)    
Basic Products  1.890  -1.040 
Basic Products*  -  -0.620 
DE LA CAL (1981)    
Total Imports (short term)  -  -0.180 
Total Imports (long term)  -  -1.488 
Basic Products  0.544  - 
Manufactured Products  0.852  - 
Capital Goods  -  -1.020 
Oil -   0.313 
CARVALHO & HADDAD (1980)    
Basic Products  0.589  - 
Manufactured Products  0.576  - 
World Imports (PB)  0.786  - 
World Imports (PM)  2.825  - 
LEMGRUBER (1976)     
Total Imports  -  -0.495 
Capital Goods  -  -0.727 
Intermediate Consumption Goods  -  -0.023 
Final Consumption Goods  -  -0.213 
Oil -  0.663 
TYLER (1976)     
Manufactured Products  0.878  - 
World Imports (PM)  0.003  - 
SUPLICY (1976)     
Total Imports  -  -0.134 
Basic Products  0.567  - 
Manufactured Products  0.872  - 
World Imports (PB)  1.183  - 
World Imports (PM)  2.021  - 
DOELLINGER et al. (1971)     
Basic Products  2.120  - 
Manufactured Products  1.480  - 
  PB – Basic Products; PM – Manufactured Products and * imports without wheat and oil  
  Source: Bibliography Reference 
 
   12
             The  model of the opportunity cost for foreign exchange for a large number of 
products, according to the development of the concept popularized by HARBERGER 
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E* = the opportunity cost of foreign exchange; 
E  = current exchange rate; 
ε’i = elasticity-price of offer of export of each class of products i in relation to the exchange 
rate; 
η’j = elasticity-price of demand of import of each class of products j in relation to the 
exchange rate; 
Xi = export amount in dollars of class of products i; 
Mj = import amount in dollars of class of products j; 
t*xi= sum of distortions in the market of factors and tariffs over the exports of each class of 
products i; and 
t*mj = sum of distortions in the market of factors and tariffs over the imports of each class 
of products j.      
 
 























        ( 2 )  
 























        ( 3 )  
 
                                                 
12 The next step would be to ascertain that the social rate does not depend on the magnitude of the effect on the 
balance of trade. For further details and graphic presentation, see FERREIRA (2002).   13
 
and the mean export elasticity 
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4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
   The estimate of the social exchange rate, derived from the model of the 
opportunity cost for foreign exchange used import data (M) and export data (X) from the 
balance of payments published by the Fundação Getúlio Vargas in its monthly magazine 
Conjuntura Econômica. Exports comprise basic (i.e., primary) products, manufactured 
goods and others products categories. For imports there are oil, capital goods and others 
goods categories.  In relation to export and import price-elasticities we used estimates made 
by CARVALHO & DE NEGRI (2000), RESENDE (1997), DE LA CAL (1981) and   14
TYLER (1976), presented in Table 3. Finally, import tariffs and related distortions were 
approximated by the average nominal tariff protection rates (Scenario 1) and the effective 
rates (Scenario 2) estimated by KUME, PIANI, & SOUZA (2000) for the period 1980-98 
and by TYLER (2002) for 1999-2000.
13 
 
    The results from the estimations of the social exchange rate for the period 1980-
2000 are presented in Table 4. They show that the social exchange rate has always been 
higher than the exchange rate in force. For the period under analysis, there was observed a 
gradual drop in the premium of the social exchange rate (in comparison with the prevailing 
exchange rate) from 17.4% in 1980 to 2.2% in 2000 (using nominal protection rates) and 
from 20.3% in 1980 to 2.7% in 2000 (using effective tariff protection rates). Thus, the 
research results show that the mean distortion in the exchange market in 1980 was around 
20%, while in 2000 this distortion would be around 2.5%. 
 
    In the graphic representation of the social exchange rate evolution for the period 
under consideration, presented in Figure 2, we can notice three distinct phases in relation to 
the social exchange rate evolution in the period being analyzed.  The first phase comprises 
the period from 1980 to 1986 when the social exchange rate evolved downward, with a 
variation of 29.5% to 28% higher than the exchange rate in force. The second phase refers 
to the 1987-1992 period when there was a much more marked drop of the social exchange 
rate with variation from 18.5 to 6.4%. Finally, the third phase comprises the period from 
1993, where there is a certain stabilization of the rate variation with a fluctuation going 
from 6.2 to 6.9%. It is worth noticing that as of 1999, coincident with the adoption of the 
flexible exchange rate regime, we can observe a possible start of a faster decrease of the 
social exchange rate in relation to the prevailing market rate. 
 
                                                 
13 The data used in the social exchange rate estimations are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3. The mathematical 
formulation employed is the equation  (11), where the opportunity cost of foreign exchange is given by the 
E*/E ratio, and is expressed as a premium in relation to the prevailing exchange rate (E). As to the elasticity-
price coefficients, the estimates by various authors were examined, and it appears that there are no major 
discrepancies in the estimates found in the literature. Thus, the coefficients used may be considered as 
representing the mean elasticity. For the Brazilian exports before 1987, therefore, before the Kandir Law, an 
average distortion of 13% was considered related to the ICMS application. Tyler’s estimates were made for a 
yet unpublished research in progress.   15
Table 4 – Estimates of Social Exchange Rates in Brazil, 1980-2000 (E*/E) 
 





Social Exchange Rate with 
Nominal Protection Rates 
Social Exchange Rate with 
Effective Tariff Protection Rates 
1980 1.1742 1.2029 
1981 1.1334 1.1530 
1982 1.1315 1.1514 
1983 1.0781 1.0891 
1984 1.0521 1.0674 
1985 1.0659 1.0839 
1986 1.1306 1.1636 
1987 1.1817 1.2072 
1988 1.1251 1.1441 
1989 1.1155 1.1463 
1990 1.1181 1.1585 
1991 1.0956 1.1237 
1992 1.0608 1.0718 
1993 1.0610 1.0720 
1994 1.0619 1.0733 
1995 1.0744 1.0910 
1996 1.0744 1.0989 
1997 1.0917 1.1120 
1998 1.0912 1.1079 
1999 1.0841 1.0999 
2000 1.0224 1.0270   16








1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 19911992 19931994 19951996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
% 
W/nominal rate W/effective rate  
 
 
5.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
     MERCOSUL is one in many attempts to achieve some degree of regional 
integration in Latin America. The most dramatic and advanced of these attempts has been 
the NAFTA (North America Free Trade Agreement). By attempting to achieve a free trade 
area between among of the world’s most developed countries (the US and Canada) and a 
heavily protected developing country (Mexico), NAFTA possesses unique elements. At the 
time of NAFTA’s effectiveness Mexico had been undergoing a series of economic reforms, 
intended to modernize the economy and reduce protection.  By most professional accounts, 
Mexico has been a major beneficiary of the NAFTA.  
 
    One major difference between MERCOSUL and NAFTA is that MERCOSUL has 
much more lofty and ambitious aims, i.e., the eventual creation of a common market 
following the effective establishment of a customs union.  With MERCOSUL, unlike 
NAFTA, the protectionism against the rest of the world was intensified instead of 
remaining unchanged. Consequently, the regional integration process with MERCOSUL 
has brought controversies into the international setting. Until recently, this integration 
process had been successful in creating trade among its members. This success however   17
has been reached at the expense of the some trade deviation in relation to the other 
countries, especially in relation to the European Union.
14         
 
    As mentioned above, the convergence towards a common market requires an 
alignment of the macroeconomic policies.  In the case of MERCOSUL, the evidence shows 
that differences in the exchange, tax and monetary policies are major factors impeding 
integration.  Deepening of the integration efforts will require reductions in the imbalances 
among MERCOSUL members. 
 
    The original hypothesis that the change in the exchange regimen in January 1999 
would cause a considerable decrease of the social exchange rate was not effectively 
demonstrated.  Moreover, the gradual decrease of the social exchange rate in the considered 
period was largely due to the commercial opening process started in Brazil at the end of the 
eighties.   
 
    The effect of the changes in the exchange policy takes longer to appear. In this 
aspect, the research results can be compared with the analysis of Brazilian import policies, 
made by KUME, PIANI & SOUZA (2000). They studied the major changes observed in 
the 1987-1998 period, along with their effects on foreign trade. According to this work, the 
Brazilian import policy can be subdivided into four stages. 
 
    During the first stage, between 1987 and 1989, the average nominal rate dropped 
from 54.7% to 29.4% and the effective rate from 67.8% to 38.8%.
15 However, the emphasis 
of the change was only on the redundant portions of the legal tariff rates while non-tariff 
barriers and the special taxation regimes that allowed imports with tax exemptions or 
reductions, were left largely untouched. Consequently, as observed by KUME, PIANI, & 
SOUZA (2000), the effects on the import volume and the domestic production were nil. In 
this period, the research results showed a reduction of the social exchange rate from 18% to 
11%, using the average nominal rate and from 21% to 15%, using the effective rate. 
 
    A second stage encompassed the 1990-93 period; it involved rather sweeping 
trade policy reforms.  After the 1990 extinction of the administrative barriers that hindered 
foreign purchases and of special regimens, a schedule of tariff reductions was enforced in 
the 1991-93 period. At the end of this process, the legal average nominal tariff rate had 
fallen to 12.5% and the effective rate to 15.2%. At this stage, the import controls were 
solely exercised by the customs tariff, at levels consistent with those in force in other 
developing economies.  In 1993 the estimated social exchange rate was about 6% (nominal 
average rate) and 7% (effective rate). 
 
                                                 
14 See, for instance, CASTILHO (2001) work on agreements and disagreements between MERCOSUR and 
European Union, where MERCOSUR’S bargaining power is pointed out in the negotiations with the 
European Union, exactly for this reason. 
15 In addition to the nominal rate applicable to a certain product, the effective rate also considers the rates 
applied to its inputs that encumber its cost structure. In other words, the effective rate measures the increased 
in the added value provided by the rate structure in relation to the added value without the presence of rates 
(free trade situation). For further details and alternative methodologies to estimate the effective rate, see 
WILLIAMSON (1989), pp 82-83, op cit.   18
    During a third stage, occurring during 1994, the rate reductions were accelerated 
as a result from the need to impose more discipline on the domestic prices, by expanding 
the foreign competition, what caused also the anticipation of the commitments assumed at 
MERCOSUR for the establishment of the foreign common rate.  These actions caused a 
decrease of the nominal average rate to 10.2% and of the effective rate to 12.3%. As a 
result, the acquisitions abroad were intensified and Brazil, prompted by the real currency 
appreciation taking place as a part of the Plano Real, started having commercial deficits as 
of the last two months of that year, a fact that had not occurred since January 1987.
16 
 
    During a fourth stage, covering the period beginning in 1995, the country suffered 
a set back in the import liberalization process that had been gradually implemented since 
1988. The Mexican crisis in December 1994 made clear the gravity of the risks to maintain 
high deficits in current transactions and led the Brazilian government to increase tariff rates 
on automobiles, electro-electronic goods and textiles, among others. At the same time, the 
nontariff barriers were reapplied to foreign products, as a pre-payment of imports, 
compliance with health requirements and creation of a long list of products for which a 
previous import license was required again.  In 1995, the average nominal rate increased to 
12.2% and the effective rate to 15.6%, while the estimated social exchange rate was 7.4%, 
using the average nominal rate, and 9.1% using the effective rate. 
 
    Finally, in November 1997, in view of the Asian crisis effects on the international 
financial market, the Brazilian government raised the customs duties in three percentage 
points, causing the average rate to rise to 14.9% and the effective rate to 18.6%. After a 
relative stabilization, in 1997 the estimate of the social exchange rate has its first increase, 
going up to 9.1% using the average nominal rate and 11.2% using the effective rate. 
 
   Given the agriculture potential in MERCOSUL countries, the investment in 
agronomic research is a fundamental factor to increase its international competitiveness. 
Both Argentina and Brazil have excellent public systems of agricultural research. Although 
the available resources have dwindled in the last years, both research systems are still 
productive.                                                                                                 
 
   Another major question yet to be answered concerns the private sector’s 
investment needs, mainly for the agricultural sector. We can observe a large flow of new 
technologies and an increase of investments in research. We can already perceive a greater 
immediate need of public investments in research and in science-oriented formation to 
meet a potential demand. 
  
    Despite the setbacks in 1995, the reach of the commercial opening measures 
adopted in Brazil since 1988 has been remarkable. Nominal and effective protection rates 
were substantially reduced, and the result has been a greater uniformity in the structure of 
incentives provided by the tariff rates, implying less governmental intervention in the 
allocation of society’s scarce resources. However, there was no important change in the 
order of activities according to the degree of effective protection. To conclude, the effects 
of both - the trade policy liberalization and the adopting of a flexible exchange rate regime 
                                                 
16 See KUME, PIANI, & SOUZA (2000), op. cit.   19
- will only be felt in the medium and long terms, but we can already clearly perceive some 
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